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with a job or obtain tenure!). Unless one actively resists
and consciously tries to keep sight of who they are
while philosophizing—which means being true to one’s
interests, writing on topics that they find fascinating
(regardless of their disciplinary uptake), and relying upon
ways of knowing informed by the particularities of human
identity, to say the least—professionalized philosophy has
a tendency to disembody its practitioners. It can, as Kurt
Cobain sings, “beat me out of me.” This disembodiment is
strange since most philosophy, especially since Socrates,
begins under the banner of “know thy self.” How are we
to understand this “self” that philosophy ask us to know,
when, for many, any attempt at using logos to think about
ethnos results in nonphilosophy? Ultimately, as I suggest,
the act of writing philosophy often amounts to a sleight of
hand, one resulting in the alienation, estrangement, and
eventual replacement of one sense of self with another that
may not really be you.
Contrary to this, I suggest that you be yourself in
professional philosophy, especially if you are a racial or
ethnic minority. Note, however, that this suggestion does
not imply that one is (nor should they be) altogether defined
by their gender, race, or ethnicity in terms of their ability to
think. While there remains something to be said about the
inability of controlling how one’s colleagues or society at
large views you, that is, the inescapability of a racialized
existence, to demand that all philosophers who happen
to be of “minority” status think in essentialized ways that
correspond with race and/or gender would be an injustice
and quite the totalizing experience. Such a strong stance
would deny many philosophers their status as philosopher
plain and simple (not a “Black,” “Latinx,” or what-have-you
philosopher). For that reason, my suggestion aims at those
who hold that one’s race or ethnic identity is completely
irrelevant or out of place in philosophy; it is aimed at those
who would devalue the epistemic importance of race,
ethnicity, or gender altogether.
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This essay is about the loss of voice.1 It is about the ways
in which the act of writing philosophy often results in an
alienating and existentially meaningless experience for
many budding philosophers, particularly those who wish
to think from their racialized and gendered identities in
professional academic philosophy (and still come out
PAGE 2

In order to give shape to this line of thought, I ask the
following question: What does philosophy have to do with
you? Or, perhaps more precisely, what do you have to
do with philosophy? Such a question routinely kick-starts
my Latin American philosophy course. It is a question
that students (both undergraduate and graduate) often
have a hard time answering, regardless of their ethnic or
racial background, sexuality, or gender. It is also one that
philosophers do not ask enough (or at all for that matter).
I start my course in this way because, as I see it, whatever
“Latin American” or “Latinx” philosophy might be, it is part
of the embodiment of philosophy, a movement (for lack of
a better word) that has found new meaning in professional
philosophy and is part of a process that says who you are
matters philosophically.
To call oneself a “Latin American philosopher,” or,
perhaps more specifically, to philosophize from a Latin
American or Latinx standpoint, is to affirm the importance
of one’s Latinidad—whatever that might mean—while
doing philosophy. This is quite the political statement in
mainstream academic philosophy. In a discipline that
has for the most part been dominated by white males,
both thematically and methodologically, to think from a
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nonwhite or nonmale perspective grates against the grain
of much professional academic philosophy. Moreover, to
regard one’s Latinidad as a site for knowledge-construction
and/or philosophical analysis is to ascribe epistemic value
to race or gender or the intersection of these (and more).
How you know is impacted by who you are. Charles Mills
puts it best when he writes that because of the centrality of
whiteness to professional philosophy’s self-conception, a
point I explain below, those wishing to think from nonwhite
perspectives are “challenging philosophy in a way that
Black scholars in other areas are not challenging theirs.”2
Not only should philosophers embrace this challenge, but
if philosophy is to thrive today, attract more students from
a variety of backgrounds, and survive in higher education,
it must. Problem is, many would rather sink the ship than
keep it afloat.

DISEMBODIED PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE

The disembodiment of philosophy comes from
certain methodological constraints, metaphilosophical
commitments, and normative ideals about the end goal of
philosophical thought. When first introducing philosophy
to students unfamiliar with it, professors and instructors
oftentimes fall back upon the transliteration of the Greek
work philosophia as the “love of wisdom.” Given the
meaning of the particles philo and sophia, these professors
and instructors are not wrong when reducing philosophy
to such an easily digestible cliché (I, too, am guilty of
reaching for this formula when I am having a hard time
explaining what philosophy is and what philosophers do).
Nevertheless, as I argue below, to think of philosophy
as merely the love of wisdom is an impoverishment and
understatement. First off, most people understand being
wise as synonymous with being knowledgeable, and
knowledge is not necessarily the same as wisdom. I can
know a great deal; that does not make me wise. Wisdom is
critical insight or a disposition towards knowing/knowledge
that may accompany the state of being knowledgeable, but
it also might not. Socrates purported to know nothing or
very little but was said to be wise. Loving wisdom does not
mean a collection of facts. Second, the loving of wisdom
was never meant to be an end in itself; no one loves wisdom
simply for the sake of loving wisdom (that would be weird).
Philosophers aspire after wisdom because it frees one
from obscurantism, ignorance, dogma, falsehood, and
various forms of ideology and false-consciousness that
support social and political institutions (many of which
happen to be unjust). Thus, there is an inherent liberatory
quality to philosophy, as Ignacio Ellacuría put it (again, see
below), one that extends all the way to Western academic
understandings of the origins of this field.
Philosophy is also often described as the universal science
of thought, a rigorous and critical examination of “how
things in the broadest sense of the term hang together in
the broadest sense of the term,” to use the famous quote
by Wilfred Sellars. Here, philosophy is the province of “big
questions.” While a precise definition might be untenable,
most philosophers agree that their discipline asks important
questions about life, death, right, wrong, good and bad, the
existence of God, the nature of religious belief, the extent
of human knowledge, the meaning of life, and a whole lot
more. In order to ask “big questions,” however, one has
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to achieve sufficient discursive breadth, that is, a way of
speaking, thinking, and writing that places you on the same
page as the great thinkers of history, e.g., Plato, Augustine,
Descartes, Kant, and others. From this perspective, the
practice of philosophy requires that we think in a way that
transcends human difference, in a way that arises above
the particularities of our individual or collective historical
and cultural contexts such that our thoughts speak across
the ages and ask questions pertaining to all of humanity,
not just our individual self or subset of humanity.
The problem with such a conception of philosophy is
that in being asked to write, speak, and think in a way
that spans space and time, students of philosophy are
often forced to downplay or drop those aspects of their
selves that tend to be rather meaningful on individual
(and collective) levels. Worse, since achieving the widest
discursive breadth possible often comes by finding a
common (read “universal”) ground, budding philosophers
are often forced to speak in terms articulated by those of
the dominant perspective(s). This is the particular knot that
I wish readers think to about: the downplaying of racial or
ethnic difference and the simultaneous embracement of a
supposed “race-less” disembodied voice.
In “Philosophy Raced, Philosophy Erased,” Mills identifies
the pervasive whiteness of professionalized philosophy as
the root of this problem.3 As he explains, philosophers of
color face an assortment of challenges upon entering the
ranks of professional philosophy. Some of these include
implicit and explicit racial/gender biases, microaggressions,
double standards, forms of tokenization, and outright
hostility or animosity. All of these, unfortunately, have come
to be expected by racialized minorities entering academic
philosophy (which does not make them right). Professional
philosophers can rectify the above if the political will and
various administrative and institutional support mechanisms
are in place. Sadly, both tend to be lacking (but that is a
different matter). The most perplexing and unique challenge
faced by philosophers of color, Mills continues, is the
relegation of the types of interpersonal, structural, and
historical issues faced by racialized minorities to the status
of “nonphilosophy.” In particular, Mills has in mind issues
revolving around race, but one can easily add related
concepts, historical events, or phenomena such as racism,
sexism, colonization, slavery, various types of objectification
and denigration, political marginalization, economic
exploitation (as women and/or people of color), and more.
In comparison to other fields, such as literature, sociology,
or history, philosophy aspires to ask perennial questions.
“Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from
the contingent, the corporeal, the temporal, the material,
to get at necessary, spiritual, eternal, ideal truth,” writes
Mills.4 From this perspective, the range of questions that
fall into the domain of philosophy ought not to include
those that lack broad appeal. Questions devoted to race
and processes of racialization, therefore, are of limited
relevance to “philosophers” on account of them being
“local,” particular, too corporeal (as it were), and mostly
of interest to “minorities.” It is not that white philosophers
altogether lack interest in any of the above concerns. Instead,
Mills’s analysis centers on the way questions connected to
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race or processes of racialization are considered “applied”
issues, “special topics,” perhaps even “non-ideal theory,”
or whatever term is used to confer peripheral, tangential,
outlier-status as not really philosophy.
A major reason for this marginalization is the fact that the
hegemonic group of individuals traditionally viewed as
“philosophers” lack the range of perspective often shared
by people of color. To make matters worse, this group
also inhabits a position of racialized normativity. Using
political philosophy as an example, Mills explains that the
experiential starting point for people of color, generally
speaking, runs contrary to the basic assumptions about
political subjectivity maintained by many “mainstream”
thinkers. He writes, “Your moral equality and personhood
are certainly not recognized; you are not equal before
the law; and the state is not seeking to protect but to
encroach upon your interests in the interests of the white
population.”5 In the context of the United States’s racial
imaginary, African Americans are fundamentally viewed as
criminal and dangerous; the existence of Latinx peoples
is predicated on tropes of “illegality.” While the rights
of Blacks, Hispanics, and even Native Americans (via
treaty) might be protected nominally, these protections
are not automatically granted in our society but must
be continuously fought for and asserted, a point that
gives new meaning to the idea of racial privilege. All
this is to say, a metaphysically stable and legally secure
political subjectivity is something philosophers can take
for granted only when the class of individuals who make
up professional philosophy are treated the same way by
the law, show up in similar manners in terms of political
representation, and also share the same normative
concerns. Thus, when relying upon one’s (white racial) self
as a frame of reference for discussion of rights or political
organization, it is quite possible that, in academic contexts
with other philosophers who share the same racialized
starting point, the particularity of your view is obscured and
the experience of “unraced” whites becomes the norm, as
Mills puts it.
I offer the question of political justice as it relates to
undocumented immigrants or irregular migration as
another example. At the onset of A Theory of Justice, John
Rawls, arguably the most important political philosopher in
the twentieth century, writes that his main object of inquiry
is justice, the basic structure of society.6 Seeking a simple
conception of justice, Rawls limits his project in two ways
(one of which is important here): “I shall be satisfied if it is
possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice
for the basic structure of society conceived for the time
being as a closed system isolated from other societies.”7 In
The Law of Peoples, he adds “this position views society as
closed: persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death.”8
In Political Liberalism, Rawls continues: “That a society is
closed is a considerable abstraction, justified only because
it enables us to speak about certain main questions free
from distracting details.”9 Besides viewing the plight of
undocumented peoples in places like the United States as
a “distracting detail,” Rawls’s restriction betrays his own
principles by providing too much information regarding
the persons behind the famed “veil of ignorance.” When
formulating the basic principles upon which the structure
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of society will depend, we may not know if we are rich,
poor, Black, white, able-bodied or not, male or female, gay
or straight, but we do know that everyone behind the veil
will be a citizen or, at the very least, have regular status.
Through this restriction Rawls limits justice, in its most
basic form, to those who are formal members of the body
politic, a move that alienates upwards of twelve million
undocumented people from the basic structure of society
(i.e., justice). Unless such a limitation is justifiable, which
is to say that the burden is upon Rawlsians to show how
this is not an arbitrary starting point for a theory of justice
(again, appealing to Rawls’s own standards), how can the
range of justice, in its most basic form, be so narrow?
My goal is not to engage the burgeoning literature on the
ethics of immigration when I ask the above question—a
question that many Rawlsians and political philosophers
will dismiss as an instance in “non-ideal theory” (yet another
means of downplaying the unique philosophical challenges
posed by undocumented or irregular immigration). Instead,
building upon Mills’s point, my goal is to demonstrate how
many of the assumptions that “mainstream” philosophy
depends upon, like taking citizenship (or, even more
abstractly, “membership”) for granted when constructing
a theory of justice, reflect a rather particular perspective
which shapes a specific set of normative concerns. Now,
imagine this happening in the aggregate, adding things
like prestige, the weight of tradition, and the “need for
rigor” into the mix. One can easily see how many of those
intellectual endeavors that might attract and welcome
more nonwhite people into philosophy—and, again, this is
not to say that philosophers of color are only interested
in “projects of color,” so to speak—are jettisoned (I am
tempted to say “deported”) to ethnic studies, area studies,
women and gender studies, etc.
It is important to underscore that it is not merely the
numerical overrepresentation of whites that leads to the
alienation of minorities in philosophy. Mills’s ultimate
concern is with gate-keeping methodological constraints
and “border-building” tactics that simultaneously curtail
the diversification of philosophy as well as obscure the
particularity of those concerns by passing themselves
off as “universal.” Through this process, professional
philosophy remains overpopulated by white people (men
in particular) and dominated by white interests passing
themselves off as race-less philosophical concerns. To put
it differently, if philosophy is the “science of thought,” as a
“science” it depends on a particular method. Such method
does not come from nowhere but is produced by specific
philosophers in particular places and points in time. In the
context of professional academic philosophy, this means
students are asked to speak, write, and think in ways that
historically make sense within a methodological context
articulated predominantly by dead white men.
Indeed, as one can probably realize, there is no such thing
as an objective, impartial “view from nowhere,” a point
that sets up quite an interesting predicament: either way
one goes about it, one cannot avoid philosophizing from
a particularized perspective; it is either yours or that of the
dominant point of view passing itself off as universal. I ask,
why not choose to be you when you philosophize?
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LIBERATING PHILOSOPHY: ON WHY I FAST
PHILOSOPHICALLY
For many individuals attempting to philosophize from
racialized identities, philosophy can (and should) mean so
much more than the above. At the very least, it should help
liberate the mind as well as the body. Problem is, the former
is typically viewed as exclusive to philosophy, the locus of
our freedom and volition (if such things exist), while the latter
is obviously important, but a contingent and accidental fact
about you. For racialized “minorities,” however, seemingly
adding new significance to Glaucon’s argument in The
Republic that the semblance of being a good person is
more important than actually being good, one cannot take
their corporeal existence lightly. How you look in the eyes
of others can result in life or death. Unfortunately, as this
essay explains, most academic philosophy takes place from
a perspective of great privilege, where how one appears
or looks to others is irrelevant (and, moreover, should
be irrelevant when it comes to philosophy). The kinds of
questions that philosophers ask (i.e., “big questions”)
take for granted a philosophical subjectivity that is more
or less secure. Freedom of mind, thought, and conscience
are prerequisite and assumed outright. For women, racial
minorities, colonized peoples (and those whose sense of
self begins from a position of oppression) such a starting
point is a luxury. To think from these perspectives means
one cannot help but use philosophy for the sake of freedom.
Think about it in terms of hunger. When you are hungry
all you can do is think about food (the stuff of Snickers
commercials). Once you are satiated, when you have eaten,
then you are capable of entertaining and contemplating
abstract philosophical questions (those about God, life,
death, good and bad, etc.). Philosophy, to continue with
this metaphor, often begins from the point of view of
persons stuffed to the gills! To philosophize in a way where
you matter, the racialized and gendered you, means that
one uses philosophy such that it resembles “the love of
wisdom,” but more so in terms of how wisdom sets us
free from misguided and hubristic ways of knowing. Along
these lines, in “The Liberating Function of Philosophy,” an
essay that has become an important point of departure for
much of my work, Ellacuría writes,
We can say that philosophy has always had to do
with freedom, though in different ways. It has
been assumed that philosophy is the task of free
individuals and free peoples, free at least of the
basic needs that can suppress the kind of thinking
we call philosophy. We also acknowledge that it has
a liberating function for those who philosophize
and that as the supreme exercise of reason, it has
liberated people from obscurantism, ignorance,
and falsehood. Throughout the centuries, from
the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment, through
all methods of critical thinking, we have ascribed
a great superiority to reason, and to philosophical
reason in particular, as a result of its liberating
function.
He continues, “[T]his matter of philosophy and freedom gets
to the fundamental purpose of philosophical knowledge,
FALL 2018 | VOLUME 18 | NUMBER 1

which even if it is understood as a search for truth, cannot
be reduced to being a search for truth for its own sake.”10
We should appreciate philosophy for its liberatory potential.
How is this liberatory potential cut short when sexual,
racial, and political oppression are not viewed as proper
or “traditional” philosophical topics? Moreover, given that
philosophy as a discipline seemingly thrives when written
in the guise of dialogues, how is this field needlessly
restrained when it delineates the range of perspective to
sanctified, hegemonic perspectives that speak on behalf
of all of humanity?
While philosophy might survive in the above described ways,
it surely will not thrive. In addition to its institutionalized
formulations, philosophy must shift from an erudite “love
of wisdom,” a benchmark on the register of Western civility,
to a process in which “the telos of thinking, if there is any,
is the struggle against dehumanization, understood as the
affirmation of sociality and the negation of its negation
[coloniality],” to quote Nelson Maldonado-Torres.11 That is
to say, philosophy is not an end in itself but part of the
struggle against multiple forms of dehumanization and
oppression. It is the affirmation of sociality and the denial
of antisocial behavior. Philosophy ought not only to free
one from misuses of reason or the type of intellectual
laziness from which all humans suffer, but it also should
be used to liberate ourselves from the types of intellectual
nonage imposed by social injustice, racial and gendered
totalization, and oppression. In using philosophy to think
about the particularities of human existence, we should
philosophize as hungry persons. Again, I ask, how are you
(i.e., the person you are, your identity, your race, gender,
ethnicity, or nationality) relevant to philosophy?
I conclude with the prayer, as he refers to it, Frantz Fanon
uses to end Black Skin, White Mask: “O my body, always
make of me a man who questions!”12 I find these words to be
hauntingly bothersome and yet extremely fascinating and
important. I am bothered by them not because I dislike this
statement. Being a man of color in professional academic
philosophy, I often find myself often repeating Fanon’s
prayer as a mantra. This passage is perplexing, however,
because it comes at the end of a book devoted to thinking
through the significance of the Black body, in a way that
sees it burdened by negative valuations and internalized
displeasure. To paraphrase what Fanon writes at the onset
of The Wretched of the Earth, decolonization results in
a new humanism, a novel social order, one in which the
relations of domination that define the meaning of “white”
and “Black” today are destroyed and constructed anew; the
replacement of one species of humankind with another.
Along these lines, the above prayer signifies Fanon’s
attempt at finding value in his Black body in the midst of
a world that devalues it. In these words, Fanon recognizes
his Black body as enabling philosophical reflection, just the
type of attitude towards race and processes of racialization
I advocate for in this essay.
Nevertheless, for one’s body to become the source of
philosophical skepticism, it has to inhabit the site of
social exclusion. It has to bear the mark of difference and
run against the racial, gender, and sexual normativity of
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one’s social structure. If not “different,” one will not be
afforded the looks, the bewilderment, the fear, the gaze
that generates the level of self-awareness leading to the
type of questioning that Fanon is grateful for. Along these
lines, I, too, am grateful for being different (especially in
philosophy, to say the least). Being a nonwhite Latino,
I recall (as a child, mind you) the feeling and shame of
not being “American.” Although I was born in the United
States and hold US citizenship, I distinctively remember
thinking that if you closed your eyes and pictured the
ideal “American,” a brown-skinned boy from the east side
of Los Angeles would not be the first picture that came
to mind. The American imaginary remains thoroughly
racialized, gendered, regionalized (say, coming from
the Midwest or East Coast), linguistically impoverished
(that is, monolingual), overly Christian, and heterosexual
(and I’m sure there is more). Being Hispanic, Latino, or
Latinx, whichever one prefers, allowed me the epistemic
vantagepoint to question what it means to be “American,”
a citizen of the United States. For me, membership is not
something I take lightly.
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And yet, for such a proclivity to questioning to be possible,
the racial normativity that accompanies white supremacy
had to have come into effect (and this is where I am
bothered by Fanon’s words). I often worry about those
times in which whiteness or white supremacy becomes
necessary, where we find some meaning in the existence
of whiteness. Here, this worry about constructing a
theodicy for whiteness is inspired by what Aimé Césaire
writes in Discourse on Colonialism: “[B]etween colonization
and civilization there is an infinite distance; that out of all
the colonial expeditions that have been undertaken, out of
all the colonial statutes that have been drawn up, out of
all the memoranda that have been dispatched by all the
ministries, there could not come a single human value.”13
For these reasons, my nonwhite body should not be the
means through which I approach philosophy. However, it
is, and as such, my approach to philosophy does not end
with enlightenment, but liberation.
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